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'-- Persecution, says he, all the history of the world is full of it. Perpetrating national hatred 
among nations. 
-- But do you know what a nation means? says John Wyse. 
-- Yes, says Bloom. 
-- What is it? says John Wyse. 
-- A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people living in the same place. 
-- By God, then, says Ned, laughing, if that's so I'm a nation for I'm living in the same place 
for the past five years. 
So of course everyone had the lauph at Bloom and says he, trying to muck out of it: 
- Or also living in different places. 
-- That covers my case, says Joe. 
-- What is your nation if I may ask? says the citizen. 
-- Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland. 
The citizen said nothing only cleared the spit out of his gullet and, gob, he spat a Red Bank 
oyster out of him right in the corner.' (Joyce 1986: 271-2) 
 
1. Introduction: Statism, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism 
We live in a world of states. We also live in a world of nations. These are both important 
facts, though of different orders. States are legal entities. Even if the government is 
incapable of the most elementary state function - maintaining public order within its territory - 
a state exists so long as it is recognized by other states (see Jackson 1990). Nations are 
institutionally embodied only contingently. Ultimately, the existence of a nation turns on what 
goes on inside people's heads. This remark is not intended to be disparaging to the potency 
of the national idea. It is capable of tearing apart states, as in Bosnia; and it is capable of 
eliciting enormous sacrifices in the pursuit of national autonomy, as in East Timor or among 
the Kurds in Turkey at the present time. Three points seem to me most interesting about the 
state system and the idea of nationality: that each is associated with a supporting ideology; 
that these two ideologies are in a curious way parallel to one another; yet that they are 
necessarily in competition with one another because they occupy the same conceptual 
space, in a way that I shall explain. 
In what follows, I shall lay out the leading ideas of statism (section 2) and nationalism 
(section 3), including (in accordance with my title) their implications for intervention and 
redistribution. I shall then discuss the relations between them (section 4). Following that 
(section 5), I introduce a third doctrine, compolitanism, which (as I define it) is a combination 
of moral individualism and moral universalism. Cosmopolitanism, I argue, is likely to lead to 
conclusions substantially more sympathetic to intervention and international redistribution 
than either statism or cosmopolitanism. The next two sections (6 and 7) take up the difficult 
and complicated question of the relation between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Section 
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8 concludes by arguing that there are no good arguments against cosmopolitanism, and in 
particular that properly understood it is compatible with civic nationalism. This implies that 
civic nationalism can be combined with cosmopolitan conclusions about intervention and 
redistribution. 
 
2. Statism 
The statist ideology is believed in by all governments and a large number of international 
relations theorists. The legal basis of statism is the equality of states and the absence of any 
higher authority to which states are legally subservient. This means that the binding force of 
international treaties depends on consent. A strong norm of the society of states in its 
current incarnation (though not in earlier centuries) is the absolute inviolability of borders. No 
matter how corrupt or incompetent a state may be, the 'international community' (which for 
this purpose means the other states) is commited to condemning any attempt by another 
state to annex some or all of its territory, and is supposed to come to the aid of the state 
attacked. The idea of state sovereignty is also invoked to rule out coercive intervention by 
one state in the internal affairs of another. Thus, 'Article 2-7 of the United Nations Charter... 
precludes UN intervention in "matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state"'. 
A fortiori unilateral intervention is excluded (Brown 1992: 112). 
A stark illustration of the statist ideology at work is the conventional definition of 'terrorism' 
according to which terrorists are non-state agents and all states are supposed to co-operate 
in condemning and suppressing it. (The American-invented category of a 'terrorist state' is 
intended to refer to states such as Libya and Iran that, in the opinion of the State 
Department, train and support terrorists on the conventional definition.) The most fervent 
propagators of the anti-terrorist crusade are Israel and its protector, the United States. Yet 
on a less ideologically loaded definition (e.g. terrorism as the use of indiscriminate violence 
against a civil population in pursuit of political objectives), it is apparent that Israel would 
count as a minor victim of terrorism and one of the major perpetrators of it. And the United 
States would have to be regarded as by far the world's largest 'terrorist state' in virtue of its 
financial, military and diplomatic support for Israel and a whole series of right-wing regimes 
in Latin America (such as those of Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Brazil and 
Argentina) and elsewhere (e.g. Greece under the Colonels).1 (The USA has also supported 
anti-government terrorists in post-Samoza Nicaragua and Allende's Chile, making it a 
'terrorist state' even on its own definition). 
The basic morality of the state system is that set out by Hobbes in the Leviathan. Individuals 
in a 'state of nature' have a right to do whatever is necessary for their own self-preservation, 
and each person is to be the final judge of what is necessary. Thus, each has a 'right to all 
                     
1 For an excellent discussion of state terrorism, understood as "cases [in which] those who use 
violence for political purposes are those in power or their agents", see Jonathan Glover, 1991, 
quotation from p. 257. Glover concludes, surely correctly, that "even a casual study of state 
terrorism shows that it totally dwarfs unofficial terrorism in its contribution to human misery" (p.273). 
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things', since there is nothing that somebody might not regard as necessary for self-
preservation. Hobbes himself pointed out that anyone who wants to see a real life example 
of a state of nature has only to contemplate the actual relations between sovereigns. The 
modern theorists of statism - realists and neo-realists in international relations theory - follow 
Hobbes in seeing the international sphere as one in which states pursue power as a means 
to security.2 They add to the legal equality and sovereignty of states a parallel moral 
doctrine. According to this, there is no moral standpoint superior to that of the interest of 
states, so they are not morally answerable for their conduct. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the hardest norm concerning international distribution 
promulgated by the United Nations goes with the grain of statism and is explicitly anti-
redistributive. This declares that states are entitled to be sole beneficiaries of the natural 
resources within their territory and those in the sea and in the seabed around their shores, 
now extended to a 200-mile limit. Although the norm is obviously most advantageous to 
resource-rich countries with long coastlines, such as Canada and the USA among the rich 
countries, and among the middling ones Brazil and Chile, it was supported by third world 
countries3. It is an index of the hegemony of statist ideology in international gatherings that 
even resource-poor and landlocked countries did not propose the cosmopolitan alternative 
of treating natural resources as a common possession of mankind. 
It is true that third world countries would like transfers to them from rich countries, but they 
are most enthusiastic about forms of transfer that do not disturb the statist paradigm. Thus, 
the New International Economic Order promoted by the "Group of 77" in the late 1970s had 
as its centrepiece an increase in the price of primary commodities, to be brought about by 
some combination of restricting production and stockpiling (see Schachter, pp. 87-105). This 
would have required cooperation from the western countries, which was not forthcoming. In 
any case, it would have been a highly inefficient way of bringing about a relatively small 
transfer (the peculiarity of oil was not adequately appreciated) and would have made the 
worst-off (i.e. resource-poor) countries worse off. Despite this, it became the prime third 
world policy in virtue of its turning what was in effect aid into import income - thus putting it 
(on conventional statist principles) beyond reach of any external body's discretion. The mode 
of transfer currently in vogue is similarly statist in the same sense: the cancellation of debt. It 
is worth observing that this also does nothing for the poorest countries: even the collective 
insanity that gripped the world's bankers as they desperately sought homes for petrodollars 
after 1975 did not mean that they were prepared to lend money to, say, Burkina Faso. 
To complete the picture it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of aid provided either 
directly by countries or through bodies such as the World Bank. Much bilateral aid fits 
perfectly within the statist paradigm, since it is motivated by the perceived security or 
commercial interests of the donor country. As far as the rest is concerned, the two most 
                     
2 For realism, see Hans Morgenthau, 1948; for neo-realism Kenneth Waltz, 1959. 
3 "In recent years no normative principle has been more vigorously asserted by the less-developed 
countries than that of 'permanent sovereignty over natural resources,' a concept generally defined 
by its proponents as the 'inalienable" right of each state to full exercise of authority over its natural 
wealth and the correlative right to dispose of its resources fully and freely." (Oscar Schachter 1977: 
124 
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salient features are the lack of a hard norm (comparable to that stipulating national 
sovereignty over natural resources) mandating contributions, and the small amount of aid in 
relation to the national incomes of the rich countries. Thus, the United Nations norm that 
official aid should amount to 0.7% of GNP is a mere aspiration, with no mechanism to 
ensure compliance, and actual performance falls far short, with the USA and Britain running 
at a mere 0.2% or thereabouts. 
Nor is aid unequivocally welcomed by the potential beneficiaries. The statist ideology has no 
more vociferous adherents than the governments of third world countries - the more so, on 
the whole, the less their regime can bear international scrutiny. It is true that the practice of 
attaching conditions to aid (conditions either about the nature of the regime or the way in 
which the funds are used) does not violate the norm of non-intervention, because 
withholding aid is technically a non-benefit rather than a sanction.4 Nevertheless, it 
constitutes a challenge to the ideology of statism, in that it subjects states to outside 
judgement. 
 
3. Nationalism 
Nationalism is supported by a majority of the relatively small number of Anglophone political 
philosophers who have addressed the issue and a minority of international relations theorists 
(the majority being statists). It is tempting to say that nationalism is also the creed of many 
politicians and of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of millions of people all over the world. But 
the vast majority of those who create and endorse nationalist slogans are concerned with 
only one nationality: their own. This immediately introduces a contrast between practicing 
nationalists and practicing statists. Governments tend to pursue the interests of their state, in 
accordance with the statist ideology, but they accept the legitimacy of other governments 
doing likewise. To put it formally, they are willing to universalize the maxim of their actions. 
Statism is a collective analogue of universal egoism, understood as the claim that each 
person should pursue his own interests. It is thus a genuine, if pretty stunted, morality: 'the 
mutual interest of all governments in their own survival sustains a whole set of conventions 
that could be summed up as "dog does not eat dog".'5 In contrast, practical nationalism does 
not qualify as a morality at all. It is a collective analogue of selfishness elevated to the status 
of a moral imperative: I should pursue my own interests and others should serve my 
interests too. Thus, few Israelis seem prepared to see that, if their claim to a Jewish state 
has any validity, it must generate a claim to a Palestinian state that is at the very least 
equally valid. Similarly, Irish nationalists have always been reluctant to accept the existence 
                     
4 The international norm prohibits intervention but permits influence. This clearly leaves open a large 
area of uncertainty: when does influence turn into intervention? (See Brown 1992: p. 112). 
Withholding aid may seem non-coercive, but what about withdrawing it if a country has adapted its 
economy so as to rely on it? 
5 Susan Strange, 1995, pp. 154-174, quotation from p. 170. For expositions of this 'morality of states', 
see Hedley Bull, 1977 and Terry Nardin, 1983. 
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of a community with a distinct identity in Ulster. Currently, Slovak nationalists are busy 
preparing for the legal suppression the rights of the Hungarian minority to organize politically 
and make its voice heard. The dirty little secret of nationalism is that the fulfilment of most 
nationalist aspirations entails stamping on the interests and aspirations of some other 
nationality. The point is 'that very few nation-states have ever existed. What for the most part 
existed have been multi-national states, dominated by a hegemonial nation' 6. 
So prevalent is the phenomenon of nationalism as an oppressive force within a state rather 
than one serving to integrate all the inhabitants of the state's territory that it is a pretty safe 
bet anywhere in the world that a party describing itself as 'nationalist' will be dedicated to 
advancing the interests of a national group at the expense of other communities. These 
might be other nationalities or stigmatized minorities (such as gypsies, Jews or immigrants). 
In fact, virtually any descent group capable of being distinguished in some way can form a 
focus of antagonistic political mobilization. Nationalism in practice, then, is for the most part 
a way in which one group of people organizes itself to repress and exploit others. It is easy 
to see why it is so popular, uniting people across class divisions: for those with skills it 
removes a source of competition, and for those who have no objective basis for self-esteem 
a feeling of ethnic or racial superiority offers a spurious one. 
Some writers have taken the view that such communal conflicts rest on "primordial 
attachments", and conclude that there is no point in making ethical judgements about them. 
But this kind of crude determinism has been challenged by the whole weight of historical and 
social scientific research in recent decades.7 There are a potentially unlimited number of 
ways of making invidious distinctions among human beings. Playing up one particular one 
as a basis of dividing the inhabitants of a territory into different groups is a decision, and one 
normally taken with a view to some economic or political advantage. I am going to assume, 
then, that practical nationalism - the pursuit of group advantage at the expense of some 
other group - is simply indefensible morally. I shall therefore focus on nationalism as a 
universalistic doctrine. 
I take nationalism in this form to be the idea that every nation should have a state and every 
state should be the institutional embodiment of a nation. Stating it in this way makes it clear 
that nationalism is in a sense parasitic upon statism, in that it presupposes a world that is a 
society of states. We might even call it a statist heresy. 'It is of the essence of nationalism ... 
to be a revolutionary doctrine calling for the destruction of existing states and the 
construction of new ones with different boundaries, and thereby upsetting existing legal 
frameworks' (Canovan 1996: 11). It is scarcely surprising that the United Nations, as a trade 
union of states, does not recognize the national principle as a necessary or sufficient 
condition of a state's acceptability within the society of states. 
There is one, strictly limited, exception to this hostility to the idea of national self-
determination. This is enshrined in the doctrine that colonies have a right to detach 
                     
6 Booth 1995, quotation from p. 335. 
7 A sampler of this research that I have found useful is John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 1994: 
Nationalism. 
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themselves from the colonial power and become independent states. (To be covered by this, 
the colony had to be separated by salt water from the colonial power: this avoided any threat 
to the legitimacy of the last remaining land empire, the Soviet Union.) However, this is a 
once-for-all exercise of self-determination, as far as the United Nations is concerned. Once 
the ex-colony has taken its place in the society of states, it is protected by the tenets of 
statism. Similarly, the surrealistically-named Organization of African Unity (whose members 
have scarcely a uninational state among them and have mostly been the scene of civil war) 
has as a central plank the inviolability of the largely arbitrary boundaries bequeathed by the 
colonial powers. 
In the absence of salt water the United Nations does not demand division of existing states 
in any instance. It does recognize it where it happens but even here it is instructive to 
observe that statism is still respected as far as possible in the assumption that division 
should follow the lines of existing political subdivisions. Thus, the only kind of self-
determination encouraged by the international community in the former Yugoslavia was 'the 
right of the citizens of the individual Yugoslav republics to decide democratically within the 
framework of existing frontiers ... whether and to what degree their republics should be part 
of a Yugoslav state.'8 
The best known and most influential Anglophone academic nationalist is Michael Walzer, 
who has in a number of works developed a defence of a certain kind of nationalism.9 (I could 
also discuss Charles Taylor, but he is too busy fighting in Liberia at present to have much 
time left over for political philosophy.) The essence of this kind of nationalism is that, out of 
all the markers that might be (and have been) chosen by practical nationalists to differentiate 
national groups, it assumes without even discussing the issue that what defines a nationality 
is the existence of a distinctive national culture, which defines an entire moral universe for 
those who partake in it. A nation, according to this line of thought, has a national character, 
and a flourishing life can be lived only by absorbing this national character in the course of 
growing up, and then spending the rest of one's life living it . 
This universe of thought is (even though its exponents do not say so) a contemporary 
version, with some of the excrescences knocked off, of the kind of German romantic 
nationalism typified by Herder. What I find curious is that its exponents do not apparently 
regard themselves as under any obligation to take account of the bloody consequences that 
this idea has had in the past two centuries, or to respond to criticisms of its realism. Thus it 
assumes that the culture comes first and the nation state comes into being to protect it. But 
as often as not the state creates the culture. 
A language, it has been said, is a dialect with an army and a navy. If we update the quip to 
include an airforce and a nuclear arsenal, we can add the example of modern Hebrew, an 
invented language imposed by the Israeli state as a self-conscious means of welding 
disparate cultural groups into a single national identity. Moreover, especially in the first 
                     
8 Robert M. Hayden, 1995, p. 64 quoting 'Recognition of the Yugoslav Successor States', position 
paper of the German Foreign Ministry, Bonn, March 10, 1993. 
9 Especially Michael Walzer, 1983; 1980; 1994: pp. 187-200 and 1995: pp. 281-297. 
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quarter century of its existence, the Israeli state placed a very high priority on 'the "cultural 
absorption" of new immigrants'. Language and culture were merged in this process. As an 
Israeli scholar has noted: 'One of the most important tools to achieve this cultural integration 
was the ulpan, the Hebrew-language school which was used to impart the main values and 
prevailing culture of Israeli society to new arrivals.' 10 The whole idea was to break up pre-
existing linguistic-cultural identities, and forge a new identity. 
What implications has this theory of nationalism for my twin themes of intervention and 
redistribution? Not surprisingly, it is hostile to both. Cultural nationalism entails cultural 
relativism: Walzer insists that if the members of a nation are living in accordance with their 
'shared understandings', they are in a condition of justice for them, and any external 
interference is unjust. Indeed, there is not even any legitimate basis for external criticism. As 
far as international redistribution is concerned, Walzer denies that there can be any such 
thing as international distributive justice, since there is no international community united by 
shared understandings of the meanings of goods. 
 
4. Nationalism and Statism 
The obvious limitation on the scope of these prescriptions is that they are derived from the 
idea of a state as the home of a nation. It would appear that all it has to offer to states (the 
vast majority in the world) that are not nation states is that it would be better if they were 
broken up and reconstituted so as to form states of the approved kind. Despite this, 
academic nationalists tend to write as if their doctrine could provide an underpinning for 
statism, taking existing state boundaries as given. For an example, here is the well-known 
political philosopher, Jean Bethke Elshtain: 'The nation-state model may have emerged 
historically as a Western invention of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 but this form has 
been embraced worldwide. Aggriev edpeople want, not an end to the nation-state, or to 
sovereignty, or national autonomy, but an end to Western colonial or Soviet or other external 
dominance of their particular histories, languages, cultures and wounded sense of collective 
identity.'11 What has to be observed is that the Treaty of Westphalia created (or more 
precisely ratified) a system of states, not nation states, and that scarcely any of those states 
emerging from Western colonial or Soviet domination are nation states. In many cases, 
minorities have been treated worse following independence than anybody in the territory was 
before independence. The most striking illustration is Sub-Saharan Africa, which since 
decolonialization has suffered such a lethal combination of misrule and anarchy that most of 
the population are worse off economically and enjoy less physical security than under 
colonial rule. 
                     
10 Tamar Horowitz 1995, quotation from p.4. 
11 Jean Bethke Elshtain 1995, quotation from p. 270. 
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What has been said of the Yugoslav successor states may be generalized to many ex-
colonial and ex-Soviet states. 'While these republics were indeed premised on a vision of 
"government of the people, by the people, for the people," they did not imagine the "new 
birth of freedom" envisaged by Lincoln. Instead they manifested a different ideology, of 
government of one kind of people, by that kind of people, for that kind of people, at the 
expense of all others in the state who are not so fortunately situated. Hardly a vision of 
undominated equality, what these constitutions defined and were meant to implement was 
and is a system of permanent discrimination and inequality, of, by, and for the majority, the 
ethnically defined "nation" or narod.' (Hayden 1995: 64) 
We can see at work in David Miller's recent book On Nationality the curious process by 
which nationalist premises are deployed as a basis for deriving statist conclusions (Miller 
1995). Miller's version of nationalism does not make it turn on ethnocultural identity. Rather 
he defines nationality in extremely idealistic terms, and it is this that enables him to arrive at 
his anti-interventionist and anti-redistributive conclusions. Thus, suppose we pack into the 
idea of a nation the requirement that everyone regards fellow nationals as equally valuable, 
so that there are no groups that are stigmatized or discriminated against. And suppose we 
also stipulate that there must on all important matters of public policy (peace and war, 
income distribution, and so on) be a consensus among the members of a nation - a General 
Will in which all participate. Then, if this nation inhabits a state, there is surely some 
plausibility in saying that (at any rate within certain broad limits) its collective autonomy is 
valuable, because it can be seen as a contribution to the flourishing of its individual 
members. Similarly, under these very stringent conditions, the normally problematic concept 
of collective responsibility may quite plausibly be regarded as having some application. 
I do not know if there are any nation states in the world, if we understand the existence of a 
nation as requiring these conditions. (Perhaps Iceland is a candidate?) What is at any rate 
clear to me is that very few states are nations in the relevant sense, and the theory has less 
application the further they depart from its presuppositions. In the light of this, it seems to me 
quite bizarre that Miller should deploy it to explain why wealthy western countries should not 
intervene in the internal affairs of states in Sub-Saharan Africa (on the ground that this would 
be a violation of national autonomy or 'self-determination') and why they have no obligation 
to provide economic aid (on the ground that this would be a violation of collective 
responsibility) (Miller 1995: 65-79). Many of these countries do not make contact at any point 
with the requirements necessary to trigger the values of national autonomy and national 
responsibility. These include Angola and Rwanda, which Miller cites specifically as suitable 
applications of the principle of national autonomy, and Somalia, which is cited as an 
illustration of the way in which this principle of national responsibility relieves rich countries 
of an obligation to aid poor ones.12  
Manifestly, the nationalist idea has here been transformed into the doctrine of state 
autonomy and state responsibility, which is assumed still to apply even if the state is riven by 
internecine conflict between opposing groups and the government is in essence a gang of 
looters intent on squeezing what it can out of the population at whatever cost to the future of 
                     
12 For Angola and Rwanda see Miller 1995: 78 n.31, for Somalia see ibid. 63-4. 
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the country. Contrary to what Miller so confidently claims, only practical considerations 
(which may sometimes be powerful) weigh against intervention and economic aid where 
states are so radically defective in providing their citizens with the minimum of physical and 
economic security. Miller regards it as a decisive objection to cosmopolitanism that it results 
in this conclusion: I would rather urge it as a decisive objection to his own theory that it 
results in its denial. 
The essential point here is that any defence of state autonomy that depends upon states 
having certain specific characteristics can justify state autonomy only in cases in which 
these characteristics are present. Miller's move from an idealistic version of nationalism as a 
premise to statist conclusions illustrates what goes wrong when this point is ignored. But he 
is by no means alone. Thus, in his book Towards a Normative Theory of International 
Relations, Mervyn Frost argues that there is no contradiction between statism and individual 
rights because rights can flourish only in states.' (Frost 1986). But the conditions for this to 
hold are extremely demanding. 'An autonomous state is one in which the citizens experience 
the well-being of the state as fundamental to their own well-being.' (Frost 1986: 179). As 
Chris Brown notes in a critical discussion, 'few, if any, actual states fit the bill, but states 
which do not meet the requirement for autonomy cannot properly claim to be sovereign in 
their dealings with other states.' (Brown 1992: 120). Carried through consistently, Frost's 
'defence' of the state system would radically subvert it. For 'from the UN viewpoint, a state is 
a state is a state - and any attempt to distinguish between states that have earned the right 
to autonomy and those that have not is totally unacceptable' (Brown 1992: 121). 
The ideal of nationalism in its standard form is that to each nation there should correspond 
one state and to each state there should correspond one nation. However, there is a variant 
of it which makes room for more than one nationality within a single state. This accepts all 
the presuppositions of cultural nationalism - the importance of preserving national cultures 
and the priority of culture to political forms - and differs only in denying that national 
aspirations must be embodied in an independent state. I shall look at this extension of 
nationalism to multinationalism as it occurs in Will Kymlicka's recent book Multicultural 
Citizenship (Kymlicka 1995). 
There is a certain parallelism between the analyses of Frost and Kymlicka. While Frost 
makes membership of a state (of the appropriate kind) a necessary condition for the 
enjoyment of individual rights, Kymlicka presents immersion in the national culture as an 
essential context for development of a capacity for individual autonomy. It is in virtue of this 
that he feels entitled to give his book the subtitle A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. But 
Kymlicka runs into the same problem as Frost. Just as most states are not very good at 
guaranteeing human rights, so most of the cultures that have ever existed or that exist today 
are not at all conducive to the development of autonomy. 
If we were to carry through consistently the notion that group autonomy is validated by its 
contribution to individual autonomy, we would surely have to say that only national minorities 
with liberal cultures can make a valid claim to autonomy. Instead, Kymlicka says that 'both 
foreign states and national minorities form distinct political communities, with their own 
claims to self-government' and that this rules out intervention even when the political 
 
 
12 
community violates elementary liberal prescriptions (Kymlicka 1995: 167). But where does 
this unconditional claim to national independence come from? It can arise only if we refuse 
to take the fundamental human right to be to live in a liberal society and instead say that it is 
to live in an integral national culture, whether liberal or illiberal. This is, of course, a total 
capitulation to the doctrine of romantic nationalism, and an abandonment of liberalism. 
Kymlicka pursues a curious mode of argument to get to the conclusion that national 
minorities in liberal states should be permitted to pursue illiberal courses. He starts from the 
fact that western countries would not invade Saudi Arabia with a mission to clean things up, 
and uses this as a basis for arguing that national minorities should similarly be able to 
oppress women, deny religious freedom and generally behave in a barbarous fashion, so 
long as that is what their culture tells them to do (Kymlicka 1995: 165). (Kymlicka follows 
Michael Walzer in exempting genocide and slavery. It is worth noting that these are the 
subjects of separate United Nations conventions. The view that international intervention to 
stop these is justified is scarcely a distinctively liberal one.) 
There are, manifestly, many reasons for not invading Saudi Arabia, including a sensible 
reluctance to take on the formidable military hardware that the West have been busy selling 
to the Saudi government for the last twenty years, and the same unwillingness to take over 
the administration of a country (for an indefinite period) that led to the abrupt termination of 
Desert Storm. (It could plausibly be argued that the international community had an 
obligation to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Iraq under the terms of the genocide 
convention.) None of the reasons for unwillingness to take over Iraq (or a fortiori Saudi 
Arabia) provides any basis for saying that a country committed to liberal values should 
permit national minorities to behave illiberally. If we want to clear our minds about the validity 
of some principle, we should surely focus on a case in which its application is as 
straightforward as possible. It seems to me absurd to argue, as Kymlicka does, from what 
one might say about a case involving coercive international intervention to what one should 
say in one in which a court can prevent sex discrimination or religious persecution by making 
an enforceable judgement. 
Contrary to what Kymlicka claims, I do not believe that there is any liberal principle that 
supports community autonomy when it takes illiberal forms.13 The only reasons for not 
intervening that a liberal can recognize are pragmatic - which is not to deny that they are 
frequently decisive. At the level of principle, romantic nationalism and liberalism are potential 
antagonists. There is no way in which liberal premises can underwrite autonomy for all 
nationalities. 
Kymlicka seeks to cover the nakedness of his commitment to liberalism by saying that 
'liberal reformers inside the culture should seek to promote their liberal principles, through 
reason and example, and liberals outside should lend their support to any effort the group 
makes to liberalize their culture' (Kymlicka 1995: 168). But the experience of those who have 
sought to air liberal principles even quite cautiously in Saudi Arabia shows just how empty a 
concession to liberalism this is. Presumably we would no more invade Saudi Arabia to 
                     
13 The claim is made by Kymlicka at ibid., pp. 167-8. 
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enforce freedom of speech than we would to enforce any other liberal measures, and by 
Kymlicka's cockeyed reasoning this suggests that national minorities should similarly be 
allowed to prohibit liberal propaganda, thus nullifying Kymlicka's gesture towards liberalism. 
It is very unusual for a society that contravenes other fundamental liberal precepts not to 
place severe restrictions on freedom of speech. And it could no doubt be said truthfully of 
most cultures in the world that suppression of dissent is an integral element in them. 
Kymlicka would allow liberal states to withhold economically advantageous deals (such as 
membership in NAFTA or the European Union) from illiberal states, as a way of putting 
pressure on them to reform. And he says that 'obviously' there are analogies with national 
minorities. However, since national minorities do not normally have tariff barriers with the 
rest of the country, this seems a good deal less than obvious. Such economic pressure 
should not, Kymlicka says, extend to 'a total embargo or blockade'. It is not at all clear to me 
why only 'total' embargo or blockade is ruled out, since the underlying distinction is 
apparently intended to be between 'incentives and coercion'.14 Why, on his principles, 
should any sort of embargo or blockade be permissible? 
 
Many people are prepared to support economic sanctions but not forcible intervention in 
certain cases. This makes sense if one accepts the legitimacy in principle of forceful 
intervention but is convinced of the pragmatic case against. Conversely, if there really is a 
principle such as Kymlicka enunciates to rule out military intervention, I cannot see why it 
legitimates pressure (as distinct from proselytizing - where the government does not prohibit 
it) in any form. Kymlicka's proposal to allow pressure in some forms but not others seems to 
me pure fiat. 
In practice, western governments are clearly inclined to follow through the logic of Kymlicka's 
non-interventionism all the way and sign trade deals with countries whose human rights 
records are notoriously poor, such as China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 
Indeed, Kymlicka's chosen example of a country that should be left to its own devices, Saudi 
Arabia, provides an ironic footnote. So far from the British government threatening not to sell 
weapons to Saudi Arabia unless the government behaves better, the Saudis threatened not 
to buy weapons from Britain unless it deported Mohammed Al-Masari, a dissident (not, 
incidentally, a liberal one), who had been deploying the fax machine as a way of getting 
round the censorship. And the British government, explicitly acknowledging that it was 
responding to economic pressure, agreed. Only a court decision to the effect that the British 
government had not found a safe place for him to go to prevented it from summarily 
deporting him. Respect for 'cultural diversity' could scarcely be carried forward more 
slavishly. 
 
5. Cosmopolitanism 
                     
14 All quotations in this paragraph are from Kymlicka 1995: 168. 
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Cosmopolitanism is supported by a few moral and political philosophers such as Charles 
Beitz, Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer15. It is also probably the working creed of officials in 
some United Nations agencies as UNICEF and the WHO, and NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, Oxfam and Greenpeace. How great its resonance is with the publics of, say, 
western countries is not easy to tell. However, I believe that citizens are less blinkered by 
the statist vision than are their governments. The widespread support for NGOs such as 
those I mentioned (and many others dedicated to similar causes) is one sign. During the 
unfolding tragedy of Bosnia moreover, western public opinion was constantly ahead of 
governments in favouring more forceful intervention to stop bloodshed and halt or reverse 
'ethnic cleansing'. 
In Britain the whole of the scandal created by the government's lying to parliament about its 
policies on arms sales to Iraq (exposed at mind-numbing length by the Scott report) arose 
because ministers feared that the actual policy of authorizing large-scale sales to such a 
brutal regime would be unpopular with public opinion. There were close links (in which 
money passed hands) between Conservative politicians, civil servants in the Ministry of 
Defence, and the major arms firms, so the whole business was corrupt. But I am prepared to 
believe that in addition the ministers responsible genuinely believed that they were pursuing 
the national interest by authorizing contracts for the arms industry and that this justified them 
in misleading the public, who would object on the basis of 'sentimental' (i.e. principled) 
humanitarian convictions about the obligations of the UK externally. Another encouraging 
sign of cosmopolitanism thinking in western countries was the refusal of a large part of the 
French population to fall in behind Chirac's attempt to invoke nationalist sentiment in support 
of the resumption of nuclear testing. 
A cosmopolitan is, by definition, a citizen of the world. This might be taken to mean that 
cosmopolitans are committed to the creation of a world state, but this is itself an assumption 
that rests on statist ideology. The first people to call themselves cosmopolitans were the 
Stoics, who already belonged to a state that encompassed the whole of the civilized world 
(and some bits that weren't, such as Britain). The point for them was to indicate that they 
were in the first instance human beings living in a world of human beings and only 
incidentally members of polities. It is this spirit that animates contemporary cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism is, then, a moral stance constituted out of three elements, individualism, 
equality, and universality. Its unit of value is individual human beings; it does not recognize 
any categories of people as having less or more moral weight; and it includes all human 
beings. I believe that the logic of cosmopolitanism entails that the interests of future people 
have as much significance as those of contemporaries, but I shall not make much of that 
here. 
Utilitarianism is the simplest form of cosmopolitanism, since it says that we weigh the 
interests of everybody on the same scales ('everybody to count for one and nobody for more 
than one') and recommend whatever actions, policies, laws or political institutions have the 
prospect of satisfying interests most in the aggregate. In practice, utilitarians have been 
                     
15 Beitz 1979 and1992, Pogge 1989 and Singer 1972 and 1979. 
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remarkably unforthcoming about the international implications of the doctrine, with the 
exception of Peter Singer. However, my reason for starting from utilitarianism is to insist that 
it is not the only or indeed the most common form of cosmopolitanism. Both Beitz and 
Pogge, the other philosophers I mentioned, take John Rawls as their starting point and 
support (in broad terms) a global version of Rawls's theory of justice. This means that they 
are committed to universal civil and political rights and the redistribution of material 
resources for the benefit of those with the least, wherever on earth they may be living. This 
seems to me the most plausible version of cosmopolitanism, and it is the one whose 
implications I shall investigate here. 
Since cosmopolitanism is defined in terms of a moral stance rather than (as with statism and 
nationalism) an institutional nostrum, there is a good deal of room for dispute about the 
institutions that would be best adapted to bringing about its vision of a just world. 'What is 
crucial to the cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to regard existing political structures as the 
source of ultimate value' (Brown 1992: 24). I would extend that to all political structures: the 
value of any political structure is entirely derivative from whatever value it contributes to (in 
the first instance anyway) human life. Thus, it is extremely plausible that cosmopolitan 
objectives require at the very least a strengthening of international institutions at every point 
(see, for example, Held 1995). But a cosmopolitan might well fear the repressive potential of 
a world state with sufficient coercive force at its disposal to bring to heel any lower-level 
entity (e.g. what are currently states). 
As far as my themes of intervention and redistribution are concerned, cosmopolitanism 
obviously does not raise any principled objection to either: ultimately, rules of international 
engagement are to be assessed by the effects on individual human beings. Thus, 
cosmopolitanism necessarily rejects the idea of a 'society as states' if that is regarded as a 
self-contained morality. But with appropriate empirical beliefs a cosmopolitan could 
nevertheless support the statist norm of non-intervention. Thus 'international peace may be 
best served in a system in which there is a convention of respect for the autonomous 
domestic jurisdiction of states' (Beitz 1992: 129). 
As Beitz observes, one may doubt this, or reject the assumption that peace is worth having 
at any price (Beitz 1992: 129). A cosmopolitan will then conclude that military intervention 
can be justifiable, while recognizing that such action is always fraught with risks, as the 
misadventures of the United Nations in Somalia illustrate all too clearly. It is also necessary 
to acknowledge that action by individual states is seldom if ever going to be disinterested 
and that humanitarianism may be a cloak for commercial or strategic interests. Economic 
sanctions avoid some of the objections, especially if organized internationally, but carry with 
them the inevitable drawback that a regime that is indifferent to the suffering of its subjects 
will not be deterred by economic sanctions so long as it can deflect their ill-effects on to 
them. Refusal to sell weapons might well hit home harder. 
Less dramatic but more promising in the long run is a spread of international legal action. 
The establishment of a UN War Crimes Tribunal is an encouraging move. More broadly, 
Jonathan Glover has argued that respect for human rights might become a condition for 
being a member in good standing of the 'society of states': 'There should be international 
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courts to which human rights complaints could be brought against states (by, or on behalf of 
individuals as well as governments). The European Court of Human Rights is a possible 
model. Acceptance of the jurisdiction of such courts, and the provision of access to their 
investigators, could be regarded as a test of a country's fitness to participate in the 
international community. It could perhaps be a condition of membership of various 
international bodies (in the way that Spain, Portugal, and Greece would not have been able 
to join the European Community while under dictatorships). It might also be made a 
condition for such things as eligibility for loans from the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund.' (Glover 1991: 272) 
As far as redistribution is concerned, the logic of cosmopolitan morality again suggests that 
individuals rather than states should be the units. The utopian ideal is of a global income tax 
levied on individuals according to a uniform progressive tariff regardless of their country of 
residence, the proceeds to be distributed to poor individuals wherever they live. 
Concessions to the reality of the existing system of states inevitably mean that 
cosmopolitans finish up by recommending redistribution from rich countries to poor ones. 
But they cannot regard that as the whole story, even within the state system, because they 
cannot be indifferent to the way in which the benefits of the transfer are distributed within the 
recipient country. Thus, cosmopolitan support for international redistribution (with states as 
the units) must always be conditional. If whatever resources are supplied to a country will 
find themselves in Swiss bank accounts belonging to members of the government, the case 
for aid disappears. But by the same token a strong prima facie case for international 
intervention then exists. 
 
6. Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism 
In discussing the policy implications of cosmopolitanism, I have already implicitly dealt with 
the relations between it and statism. The connection between cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism will be the topic of the remaining three sections of this paper. What makes this 
relation so difficult to pin down is the protean nature of nationalism. Thus, one variant of 
nationalism that could be regarded as quintessentially cosmopolitan - so long as one 
accepted its underlying assumptions - was the form popular in the nineteenth century 
according to which nationalism is a progressive force destined to pull 'backward' peoples 
such as the Welsh or the Basques out of their cultural stagnation. Certain nations - and only 
those - were charged by history with this leading role. As Margaret Canovan has observed, 
there was a 'strong element of historicism' in this theory. 'Given historicist assumptions, 
there is no more problem about discerning the gradually-emerging boundaries of historic 
nations than there is in identifying the boundaries of Marxist classes . . . . Confidence in the 
march of history made it possible for Mazzini to envisage a fully nationalist Europe made up 
of only eleven genuine nations, and to dismiss the claims of the Irish (among others) to 
constitute a nation on the grounds that they possessed no national language and no special 
historic mission.' (Canovan 1996: 8) Liah Greenfield has picked up this similarity and argued 
that that Marxism is historicist nationalism adapted so that classes instead of nations 
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become the bearers of historical change. German nationalists contrasted the backward 
political and economic condition of Germany with its cultural superiority; and for Marx 'the 
view of the proletariat as the universal class, in distinction from all other classes, reflected 
the idea of Germany as the pan-human nation in distinction from all other nations'.16 
The obvious problem with this historicist nationalism is that it has gone the same way as the 
Marxism that is (according to Greenfeld) its offshoot: scarcely anybody believes it any more, 
especially those nationalities condemned to be swept away by the historical bandwagon. 
Hence, as Zygmunt Bauman has said, contemporary nationalists 'drift towards entities 
whose radical destruction was seen, at the beginning of modernity, as the sine qua non of 
"meaningful choice." It is now the much-maligned "natural communities of origin," 
necessarily lesser than the nation-state, and once described by modernizing propaganda as 
parochial, backwater, prejudice-ridden, oppressive and stultifying, which are looked to as the 
trusting executors of streamlining, de-randomizing, and meaning-saturated human 
choices.'17
The rub lies in Bauman's passing remark that these 'natural communities of origin' are 
'necessarily lesser than the nation-state'. As I observed in section III almost every 
ethnocultural group with territorial ambitions lays claim to some 'home' territory that is also 
inhabited by at least one other community, which must (if the first group is to achieve its 
ends) be assimilated, subjugated, 'ethnically cleansed' or killed. Kymlicka's modification of 
classic romantic nationalism to allow for different ethnocultural groups to enjoy autonomy 
within a single state tends merely to reproduce the problem at a lower level. Kymlicka's own 
treatment of Quebec illustrates this. According to Kymlicka, any long-established community 
with its own institutions can claim the rights of a national minority. On this criterion, the 
Anglophone community in Quebec is a national minority within the province. Yet Kymlicka 
treats Quebec as if it were the home of only one community, the national minority and local 
majority of ethnic Francophones. He thus passes over in silence the discriminating 
legislation to which Anglophones have been subjected, and which is leading an increasing 
number to believe that they have no alternative but to emigrate, either to another province in 
Canada or another country. 
Must a cosmopolitan nevertheless concede the inevitability of ethnoculturalist sentiment, and 
simply argue for more and more subdivisions until (with a certain amount of population 
transfer as well) only ethnoculturally 'pure' political units (whether states or subdivisions of 
states) are left'? This question raises a large issue, to which I cannot begin to do justice 
here. This is how far we should take existing beliefs and attitudes as givens when operating 
in a prescriptive mode. If we take everything as given, there is nothing to be said except 
'Que sera, sera.' But if we simply assume some overnight transformation of human nature so 
that everybody becomes a born-again cosmopolitan, it is hard to see why anybody should 
pay us attention. All I can say here is that if we are pessimists we will have to settle for 
mono-ethnic political units, but we should be clear about the costs. 
                     
16 Liah Greenfeld 1995, quotation from p. 562. Marx and Engels continued to believe that 'the right of 
historical evolution' belonged to nations as well as classes. 
17 Zygmunt Baumann 1995, quotation from p. 546. 
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I am referring here not to the costs of achieving such 'pure' units, which may be very high, 
but to their fundamentally unsatisfactory nature once achieved. 'Philosophical well-wishers 
on both sides of the liberal/communitarian divide all too often courteously close their eyes on 
the realities of those "minorities" whose cause they are prompted to advocate by their 
laudable sympathy for the left-behind and deprived. Frequently the reality, when 
contemplated at close quarters, and particularly from inside, does not look exactly 
prepossessing. More often than not the "survivance" postulate turns into an awesome 
weapon of subjugation and tyranny, exercised by the acclaimed or self-proclaimed 
guardians of the "community" (ethnic, racial, religious) and its traditional values in order to 
exact obeisance from their hapless wards and to stamp out every inkling of autonomous 
choice' (Baumann 1995: 551). Ernest Renan saw the way things were going as early as 
1882 and did not like it. In 'Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?' he argued that 'the doctrines that give 
priority to culture, race or language over the political ideal of the republic are . . . to be 
regarded as an intellectual and moral degeneration: "When we thus exaggerute it [the 
importance of language and race], we imprison ourselves in a limited culture, held as being 
national. . . . Nothing can be worse for the mind, nothing more hurtful to civilization."'18
If the dead are allowed to vote, those who claim the authority to cast their votes can defeat a 
majority of the living. 'Identification with and loyalty to the nation does not involve the 
"voluntarism" of a "daily plebiscite", rather it entails acceptance of the obligations of 
belonging and the mission of the nation as articulated by its guardians . . . . Such 
glorification [of the "authentic" nation] is translated into a rejection of "western" values, 
institutions and practices, which conveniently allows ethnocrats to ignore internationally 
recognised human and civil rights and reject charges of violations of international law.'19 A 
Bosnian Serb summed up the contradiction between ethnocultural nationality and 
cosmopolitan values when he lamented 'They want to make Serbs into citizens' (Mostov 
1995: 72). Nothing could more clearly bear out Renan's 5 foreboding that 'what seemed to 
matter most was not to be an Italian, or an English, or a French citizen, but to be Italian, 
English or French . . .' (Viroli 1995: 160). 
It is possible for a society to emerge from the worst excesses of ethnocultural nationalism, 
but the evidence suggests that it takes a long time. 'History', said Stephen Dedalus, 'is a 
nightmare from which I am trying to awake' (Joyce 1986: 28). Leopold Bloom too denounced 
history at the climax of the Jew-baiting in Barney Kiernan's pub from which the epigraph for 
this paper is drawn. 'But it's no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all that. That's not life for 
men and women, insult and hatred.' (Joyce 1986: 273) Their creator, James Joyce, was an 
equally vehement opponent of 'educating the people of Ireland in the old pap of racial 
hatred.' 20 Joyce himself never set foot in Ireland again after 1912, and he was followed into 
exile in subsequent decades by thousands of men and women who found themselves 
stultified by the burden of history, in the form of the attempt to revive Gaelic, the 
                     
18 Maurizio Viroli 1995: 160, quoting Ernest Renan 1970: pp. 69-70. 
19 Julie Mostov 1995, quotation from p. 71. The expression 'daily plebiscite' refers to Ernest Renan.' 
20 'What I object most in [Griffith's] paper [Sinn Fein] is that it is educating the people of Ireland on the 
old pap of racial hatred whereas anyone can see that if the Irish question exists it exists for the 
proletariat chiefly.' Letter to Stanislaus Joyce, 25 September 1906, p. 111 of Ellman 1975. 
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subservience of state to church, and the official denigration of any culture except that of the 
peasantry. Only a half century after Irish independence in 1921 did the country begin to 
shake off the dead hand of Kathleen ni Houlihan. 
I have so far in this paper been very kind to nationalism in one respect. I have refrained from 
mentioning one of the worst of all the offences of nationalism, from a cosmopolitan point of 
view. This is its close conncection with war. By this I do not only mean that it tends to cause 
war, as a result of the irredentist claims it creates: it could equally well be said that statism 
has a tendency to cause war, as a result of the competition for power that it sets up. What I 
mean is that an extremely important strand of nationalism actually glorifies war. To be fair, I 
should add that there is a strand running from Herder through Mazzini (of whom more in the 
next section) whose ideal was a world of nations living in perfect harmony within their distinct 
moral universes. But opposed to this pleasant fantasy is another, darker, vision, in which 
warfare is welcomed as the sphere in which the supremacy of the nation reaches its apogee. 
It is not an accident that nationalists are beligerent or that national history consists largely in 
tales of battles lost and won. 
It is sometimes suggested that the idea of warfare as a source of collective purification and 
individual redemption died on the Western Front, and perhaps it has lost its appeal in 
western Europe and some other places too. But it is still alive and well in many others, 
notoriously above all in the Middle East. A few days before he fell from office in 1992, 
Yitzhak Shamir made a speech in which he said: 'We still need this truth today, the truth of 
the power of war, or at least we need to accept that war is inescapable, because without this 
the life of the individual has no purpose and the nation has no chance of survival.'21 It would 
be only too easy to find similar sentiments in the mouths of other political leaders in the 
region. Defenders of nationalism cannot, I believe, shrug off as an unfortunate idiosyncrasy 
this connection between nationalism and the idea that 'without [war] the life of the individual 
has no purpose'. For once the value of the collectivity is exalted above the value of the 
individuals making it up, some sort of fanaticism can scarcely fail to follow. 
This is not to deny that the creation of ethnoculturally homogeneous states (or sub-state 
political entities) may in some circumstances be the best option out of those open. But it is to 
say that it would have been better in the first place to avoid getting into a situation in which 
that is the best option. There is (as has often been pointed out) an analogy between 
secession and divorce. The aspect of the analogy I want to press is this. Studies are taken 
to show that divorce has bad effects on children, but all they actually show is that children of 
divorced parents do less well on various criteria than children of intact marriages. But this 
does nothing to establish that those children do worse if their parents divorce than if they 
don't. Whatever characteristics of a marriage results in its breaking up are presumably bad 
for children whether it breaks up or not - and may well be worse if it does not. The only way 
of finding out that would be to undertake a randomized controlled trial (RCT): take two 
matched sets of equally dysfunctional families and arrange for one lot of parents to divorce 
while the other lot stay married. This would obviously run into problems with the guidelines 
for experimentation with human subjects. 
                     
21 Avi Shlaim 1996, quotation from p. 17. 
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7. Nationalism Redux? 
I am assuming that on cosmopolitan premises a minimally decent state is one that respects 
human rights (which means that only a minority of states are minimally decent) and that a 
good state is a liberal democracy (which means that there are scarcely any good states 
except in western Europe and countries of European settlement). Manifestly, the conditions 
for a functioning liberal democracy are stringent. 'The state must be strong and effective 
without being excessively coercive: it must, therefore, be able to mobilize support from at 
least some large sections of the population. However, if it is also to administer equal justice 
to its citizens it cannot support itself . . . by helping one group to keep another in subjection. 
It must in general be trusted by all sections of its subjects' (Canovan 1996: 39). 
Thus, liberal democracy can be sustained (with policy outputs acceptable to a cosmopolitan) 
only if two conditions are met: 'the existence on the one hand of autonomous individuals who 
feel themselves to be free of ascriptive identities, and on the other of generalized trust 
among the members of the society, whatever their group membership. These are not 
conditions that can be taken for granted. In many parts of the world identity and solidarity are 
overwhelmingly ascriptive and communal.' 22 
Michael Walzer has said: 'bring "the people" into political life and they will arrive, marching in 
tribal ranks and orders, carrying with them their own languages, historical memories, 
customs, beliefs, and commitments' (Walzer 1994: 188). If so, it has to be said that they are 
still at a pre-political stage. They are not fit to rule themselves and should be told to come 
back when they have got rid of their particularistic commitments - under pressure from a 
state that is not (and cannot be) a liberal democracy. What I take from Liah Greenfeld's 
stimulating study Nationalism (Greenfeld  1992) is a sense of the sheer amount of 
hammering that particularistic ethnic, religious and cultural activities had to be subjected to 
in order to constitute a common English and French citizenship, a sense of allegiance to 
England and France overriding communal loyalties. The historical contingency of this kind of 
state is scarcely surprising in the light of this. 
But what are we to call this kind of state? Maurizio Viroli, in his book For Love of Country, 
proposes 'patriotism', which he distinguishes from nationalism. Of course, the most common 
contemporary usage of 'patriotism' equates it with xenophobia: we may recall Samuel 
Johnson's dismissal of it as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel'. But as intended by Viroli, it 
denotes a focus of loyalty to a state that must as part of the definition be committed to 
freedom and civic equality. Jürgen Habermas 'proposes a "patriotism of the Constitution" 
(Verfassungspatriotismus), that is, a patriotism [for Germans] based on loyalty to the 
universalistic political principles of liberty and democracy embodied in the constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany' (Viroli 1995: 169-79). But there is, obviously, another 
                     
22 Canovan 1996: 40, paraphrasing A. B. Seligman 1992. I have set out what seem to me the 
preconditions of a satisfactory liberal democratic regime in chapter 4 of Barry 1995. 
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candidate for the job of describing this phenomenon: 'nationalism', perhaps distinguished 
from ethnocultural nationalism by the modifier 'civic'. 
Thus, nationalism (of a sort) comes back in - and this is the final twist in the argument of the 
paper - as a fitting object of commendation by a cosmopolitan. It has more in common with 
the 'progressive' nationalism of a Mazzini than with the ethnocultural reaction. Indeed, it is 
interesting that, whereas Margaret Canovan (as we have seen) takes Mazzini as the primary 
example of 'romantic-collectivist nationalism', Maurizio Viroli recruits him to the ranks of the 
constitutional patriots (Canovan 1996: 6-9; Viroli 1995: 144-56). And, by picking on different 
aspects of Mazzini's thought, he too can make out a good case. Thus, where Canovan 
assimilates Mazzini to Herder, Viroli distinguishes them: 'For Mazzini patria is not an 
organism composed of different parts hierarchially ordained, as the nation was for Herder, 
but a democratic association of free and equal individuals . . . . He develops the concept of 
patria as a democratic republic which encompasses not only civil and political equality, but 
also the right to education and labour' (Viroli 1995: 148). Thus, 'love of country has to be 
enlarged and ennobled by allegiance to universal principles' (Viroli 1995: 152). So, 'the same 
word "nationalism" that Herder used to indicate a salutory antidote against cosmopolitanism 
and cultural hybridness signifies for Mazzini the degeneration of the principle of nationality' 
(Viroli 1995: 152). 
No doubt, this illustrates the way in which all good publicists are opportunists, who mix 
together ideas that are in the air regardless of their having different provenances. But it can 
be taken for the present purpose as suggesting that it should be possible to strip away the 
historicism of Mazzini's kind of nationalism and finish up with the nation as a locus of equal 
citizenship and non-exclusion. This necessarily entails the repudiation of ethnocultural 
nationalism, which is a virtual guarantee of unequal citizenship. For even in those rare cases 
where everybody within the territory belongs to the ethnocultural nation, we have seen that 
those who claim to speak in its name will define what constitute 'true' national values and 
exclude those who differ. 
David Miller's On Nationality contains a useful analysis of civic nationalism, with which a 
cosmopolitan can be quite comfortable. This is on the face of it curious, when Miller was 
presented in section IV as an arch anti-cosmopolitan. The answer is, simply, that I was 
discussing there chapter 3 of the book, whereas what I am now talking about is chapters 5 
and 6 of it. In my view all the arguments in chapter 3 are fallacious, and do not follow from 
anything in the later chapters. I shall try to show this in the next section. 
In chapters five and six of the book, what Miller is discussing are the social and intellectual 
conditions under which a liberal democratic polity can maintain itself without having to resort 
to coercion of minorities. In contrast to the (official) argument in chapter three, these 
chapters are entirely state-orientated. That is to say, they take as given a state whose 
boundaries include members of different ethnic, religious or cultural groups and ask how 
matters might be arranged so as to maximize the prospects of rational and civilized public 
discourse leading to policy outcomes that are equitable and directed at the pursuit of the 
public interest. 
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Summarizing Miller's analysis, we might say that this requires - as a precondition of a 
common society-wide self-understanding and a common arena of political discussion - that 
the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants must speak the same language, though not 
necessarily as their first language. Beyond that it requires widespread adherence to certain 
rules of the game and to the principles underlying them. It also requires a general 
willingness to transform the 'We want this' of naked group self-interest into demands of the 
form 'We believe that we have a legitimate claim to this, on the basis of broadly shared 
societal values'. As I understand him, Miller also believes that the citizens' ability to appeal a 
shared conception of the public interest requires as an underpinning some sort of common 
view of a distinctive collective enterprise. 
Of all these conditions, it seems to me that only the last can with any historical legitimacy be 
assimilated to anything like a sense of distinctive national identity. For, as Miller himself 
admits (with unnecessary concern, in my view) none of the rest has any essential reference 
to characteristics that differentiate one country from others (e.g. the United Kingdom from 
most other members of the European Union). Indeed, since he believes that Britons cannot 
satisfactorily unite around their constitution unless it is codified and modernized, it may be 
said that he is himself advocating a step that would remove one of the most important 
differences between the United Kingdom and its neighbours. After this reform had been 
carried through, it is hard to see how the content of the 'civic education' that Miller advocates 
for the schools of Britain would be very different from that to be found in other European 
liberal democracies. 
In the last chapter ('Conclusion') Miller writes: 'I have defended a civic education that 
presents to students the principles on which their society operates, and traces the historical 
process whereby those principles have come into play' (Miller 1995: 194). He goes on to say 
immediately: 'Liberals and nationalists will find themselves somewhat at odds over issues 
such as these.' But if this kind of thing is to count as 'nationalism', I simply cannot see why it 
should be regarded as being in principled conflict with liberalism. Liberals are presumably, 
first and foremost, people who want to see liberal institutions thrive. If, as seems plausible 
enough, Miller has correctly identified the conditions for their thriving it would have to be a 
perverse liberal who would object to measures necessary for the fostering of those 
conditions. Indeed, it is notable that the avowedly liberal American political theorist Amy 
Gutmann, in her work on what she calls 'democratic education', advocates a form of civic 
education that incorporates everything proposed by Miller and if anything goes beyond it 
(Gutman 1987: 1995). This no doubt reflects the American belief (which goes back well over 
a century) that the primary mission of the public school system is to turn a country of 
immigrants from a diversity of political cultures into a body of citizens capable of making 
liberal democratic institutions work. 
The only ingredient in Millerian 'nationalism' that a liberal might be inclined to gag at is, as I 
have earlier suggested, the idea that the virtues necessary to the maintenance of a liberal 
democratic polity have to be supported by some common view of a shared collective 
purpose or perhaps even destiny. There is no question that this can (and usually does) take 
forms that are profoundly incompatible with liberal principles. Liberal democratic institutions 
cannot work well, if at all, in a divided society such as Northern Ireland which is proclaimed 
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by its first Prime Minister to be 'a Protestant state for a Protestant people' or in a Croatia 
whose government makes it clear from the start that those who are not ethnic Croats can 
never hope for anything but (at best) second class citizenship. But Miller would clearly 
repudiate this kind of exclusivity just as vehemently as any liberal who claimed to reject 
nationalism in any form. 
We get the best idea of what Miller has in mind in his extended discussion in chapter six of 
the contested concept of British nationality. What is most important here are the alternatives 
that Miller rejects. He is explicit that a country containing English, Welsh and Scots (he 
ducks Northern Ireland), with a sizeable minority of immigrants or their descendants from the 
Caribbean and Indian subcontinent, cannot be defined in any terms that include nationality 
(in the sense that the English, Welsh and Scots are nationalities), race or ethnicity religion, 
or culture. The British Empire might be thought to have provided a world-historical project 
between 1880 and (at the outside) 1960, but it has had no successor. Margaret Thatcher's 
vision of Britain, in which liberty of association and democratic accountability were to be 
sacrificed to the Moloch of economic growth, clearly failed to inspire anyone outside the 
small group who grew rich quick from her efforts to implement it. Is some more promising 
alternative waiting in the wings? 
Miller is, I am bound to say, not a great deal of help here. Apart from hoping that we might 
rally round the (yet-to-be-written) constitution, he seems to suggest that the common project 
at the moment is to search for a common project. My own view is that there are a number of 
things that British people can legitimately take pride in, first among which is the country's 
remarkable contribution to the arts, the physical and biological sciences, and the social 
sciences - out of all proportion to its size and obscure location. If it is asked why somebody 
whose parents hail from Trinidad should feel any connection with these achievements, I 
would reply that they have as much reason as I have. As far as I can tell my ancestors were 
agricultural labourers in Devon and artisans in east London. I very much doubt if any of them 
had any personal connection with great events (except, according to one speculation, being 
on the receiving end of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes). Other candidates are our role 
(in which the Commonwealth shared) in the defeat of Hitler, our record of preserving the 
countryside, and the qualities of decency and diffuse kindliness celebrated by Orwell and 
still, perhaps surprisingly, surviving. (For example, I do not believe that there is any country 
in which passers by will come as quickly to the aid of somebody who falls down in the street 
or is involved in a car accident.) 
Although such things might form the basis of a national identity unique to Britain, I would be 
the first to concede they are scarcely the stuff out of which an allembracing National 
Purpose is going to be forged. But do we need one? Do we want one? For my own part, I 
regard the lack of one as among the most attractive features of contemporary Britain. 
 
8. Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism Restated 
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I have discussed the puzzle that Miller thinks his version of nationalism is inconsistent with 
liberalism, but there remains the further puzzle of his thinking it inconsistent with 
cosmopolitanism. The answer he would give is that even civic nationalism will entail that 
fellow nationals have obligations to one another that they do not have to people in the rest of 
the world. But this in no way contradicts the universalistic tenets of cosmopolitanism. 
Morality is, indeed, universal in its nature - Miller's fundamental error lies in denying this 
cosmopolitan claim. But that universal morality consists largely in general prescriptions that, 
in the actual circumstances of everyday life, generate specific obligations: to keep promises, 
to reciprocate benefits, and to play our part in the social practices of our society, such as 
those that prescribe the obligations of adults to care for children. (Any notion that there is 
something 'natural' and pre-social about the norm that devolves almost exclusive 
responsibility on the biological parents could not survive even the most casual survey of the 
wide variety of ways in which childcare responsibilities are distributed in non-western 
societies.) 
My contention is that that there is nothing about common nationality as such that can make 
contact with any morally compelling basis for ascribing special obligations. It is simply the 
wrong sort of thing. This is not to say that we may not very well have obligations to co-
nationals that we do not have to others. But we shall, I believe, always discover on further 
investigation that this obligation arises from some morally relevant relationship which is 
(more or less well) correlated with shared nationality. 
One very important source of special obligations is common membership in a state. If I ask 
why I am obliged to contribute to the old age pension of somebody I have never met and 
have no particular interest in who lives in Rotherham, but not to the pension of somebody 
equally distant to me who lives in Rennes, the answer is that I belong to the same scheme of 
social insurance as the first but not the second. Now it is also true that I (probably) share a 
nationality with the first and not the second. Moreover, there is an obvious connection 
between this fact and the fact that I belong to the same system of social security as the first 
and not the second. But we should be careful not to elide these two separate facts and 
conclude that my special obligation to the pensioner in Rotherham derives from our common 
nationality. 
Although I do not have the space at my disposal to demonstrate it here, I maintain that none 
of the apparently persuasive examples that Miller gives of special obligations arising from 
shared national identification supports his case. In every instance, I believe that we shall find 
that it is some other relationship that is carrying the moral strain. Most often it is common 
membership in a state that is doing the work, but the special obligations arising from this are 
treated as if the morally relevant feature underlying them were common nationality. 
To conclude, let me return to the anti-interventionist and redistributive conclusions argued 
for by Miller, and referred to earlier in this paper (section IV). Do these follow from the kind of 
civic nationalism that Miller advocates and I endorse? Not in the least. Let us accept the 
(dangerous) analogue of a nation-state (in the non-ethnocultural sense of 'nationality') and a 
family. Cosmopolitans can accept (as I have pointed out) that family members have special 
obligations to one another that they do not have to others. But what if those obligations are 
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not met? Following Miller's prescriptions at the level of the nation-state, we would have to 
say that nothing can legitimately be done about it. But what we actually think is that the state 
(at some level, probably local) should step in to protect children from neglect and abuse, to 
protect spouses (usually in the nature of the case women) from battery, and so on. This is 
the right analogy, a cosmopolitan will say, for violations of human rights by states. 
A parallel line of analysis applies to redistribution. Suppose we agree that families should in 
the first instance have autonomy to dispose of their income according to some internal 
decision-making process. This does not entail that this internal distribution is closed to 
outside scrutiny: indeed in Britain (and no doubt elsewhere) a man can be jailed for wilfully 
failing to support his family financially. Nor - as Miller would be among the first to insist - 
does it entail that families must be left to survive (or not) on whatever income the market 
provides them with. On the contrary, his nationalism is largely driven by the feeling that only 
national solidarity can underpin redistribution. But if the case for (qualified) autonomy for 
families does not rule out redistribution among families nor does (qualified) autonomy for 
nation states rule out redistribution among states. 
I believe that cosmopolitan morality is the only one worthy of a human being. I do not know 
how to prove this. But I do think it is possible to support it indirectly by disproving arguments 
against it. Thus, I maintain that all the arguments directed by Miller against cosmopolitanism 
are fallacious. I have dealt with all of them except one. This is that cosmopolitanism cannot 
be right because its implications - e.g. about the need for international redistribution - conflict 
with widely held convictions. The same would no doubt have been true two centuries ago if it 
had been suggested that slavery should be abolished worldwide. And a proto-Millerian only 
a century ago would have laughed to scorn the idea that women should have the same 
political and civil rights as men. Perhaps in another century it will be a matter for amazement 
that transfers from rich countries to poor ones of 0.2% of GNP were once thought adequate 
to meet the moral obligations of people in rich countries. Whether they do or not, to adduce 
as argument against there being such an obligation that a lot of people currently do not 
believe that there is seems to me unutterably feeble. If we have convictions, let us have the 
courage of those convictions. 
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